In 2013 Croatia became the most recent nation to join the European Union as part of the EU’s latest enlargement. Since then, the EU has deliberately decided to slow enlargement to consolidate existing members and reforms within the EU. However, the question of enlargement has re-emerged in recent history with several promising candidate countries. Of these candidates, Montenegro has emerged as the likely frontrunner to become the next EU member state, with other candidates such as Albania, Moldova and Ukraine following. This article will discuss how close each of the applicable candidate and some non-candidate countries are in realising membership, as well as giving an overview of the reforms that must take place first before significant EU enlargement can become politically viable.

To understand why EU enlargement has stalled since 2013, you must begin with Jean-Claude Juncker who took over the European Commission in 2014. He stated that no new members would join the EU during his five-year mandate (2014-2019) due to the belief that no candidate country, especially in the Western Balkans, would be able to meet the entry criteria by 2019. However, this sentiment also represents the significant enlargement fatigue post-2013, the eurozone crisis, migrant crisis and Brexit. Simply put, these crises had to be properly resolved by the EU first before the question of future EU enlargement could be addressed. Furthermore, there is also a strong belief that the EU must first consolidate its decision-making process by reforming the unanimous voting process into a system of qualified majority voting (QMV) for sensitive areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or EU-wide taxation. The Council already uses QMV for the majority of policy areas and expanding this to the CFSP would allow for quicker decision making and would avoid paralysis in an instance where there is a single outlier (such as Hungary under Orbán). Current criteria require 55% of member states (15/27), which represent at least 65% of the total EU population, to vote in favour.

The main EU members in favour of QMV reform are the aptly named Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting. This is a group founded in May 2023 in response to Hungarian holds on Russian sanctions packages. Current members consist of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. Several EU members remain firmly opposed to implementing QMV decision-making, with the biggest opponents being Hungary, Greece and Cyprus. Hungary was the most prolific user of the veto under Orbán. Magyar’s Tisza is seeking to reset EU relations to unlock EUR 16.7 billion in frozen funding (read my previous post for a full analysis) but has maintained the position that Hungary will use its veto to protect its interests, albeit avoiding the previous “political theatre”. Cyprus blocked Turkey from the EU’s SAFE defence procurement programme in October 2025, with Greece backing the position, and famously also vetoed a widely-accepted sanctions package against Belarus following the controversy of the 2020 election, citing EU inaction over Turkish seismic surveys conducted in waters claimed by Greece and Cyprus. As a result, the EU issued a strong statement in support of Cyprus and Greece, and threatened punitive measures against Turkey if work continued. Proponents of QMV cite this example as a case for QMV implementation, due to Cyprus leveraging its veto to hold up an uncontested sanctions package. Cyprus views this same episode as a case that unanimity works; it forced the EU to take its concerns seriously when they otherwise may not have. These individual examples suggest that whilst small EU-member states are able to escalate bilateral disputes to an EU-level, they will be extremely hesitant to give up this ability. As such, large-scale expansions, similar to the 2004 expansion where 10 countries joined at once, will likely not be seen again. Instead, each applicant will proceed with their accession individually.

Now let’s have a look at the likelihood of each potential member joining the EU as things are.

A 2025 Eurobarometer study found that 56% of EU citizens are in favour of future EU enlargement, and there are currently nine official candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. However, as Turkey’s accession negotiations have been at a standstill since 2018, Georgia’s government has halted the EU accession processes until 2028 and Bosnia and Herzegovina is significantly restricted by internal political dysfunction, they will be excluded from this analysis. Iceland and the UK will also be included as Iceland approaches a referendum on membership and the UK reassesses 10 years on from the Brexit vote.

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Montenegro:

Montenegro has emerged as the natural frontrunner in the race for EU membership. Recent momentum stems from the 2024 Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) which found that Montenegro successfully implemented reform for Chapters 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security), the procedural gate that unlocked the closure of all other chapters. It has now closed 14 of the 33 chapters and is targeting accession for 2028, as seen with their 28 by 28 campaign. This target is plausible, but any delay may see it being pushed to 2029. The country became a candidate in 2010, and began accession negotiations in 2012. In April 2026 a working group was formed and now its accession treaty will be drafted under the Cyprus Council presidency – a process that will span successive presidencies through 2027. This treaty may include stricter terms and conditions, to account for any potential democratic backsliding so that no ‘Hungary 2.0’ situation arises. The precise mechanics to enforce this are still being negotiated, but early proposals include a rule-of-law conditionality for funding, reversibility clauses allowing membership benefits to be paused or rolled back post-accession and restrictions on council voting rights during the transitional period. Spajić has explicitly opposed membership without full voting rights. If the enforcement of these safeguards requires unanimity, then there is a high chance that they would become largely symbolic. A QMV or proposed reverse-QMV system, whereby Commission-proposed sanctions take effect unless blocked by a qualified majority, would address this to avoid the veto-style political deadlock previously discussed. Whatever system of enforcement measures is decided for Montenegro will likely also set the standard for future members, regardless of their size.

Legislative reform will need to continue to be passed rapidly in order to provisionally close the remaining 19 chapters and qualify for EU membership. Assuming that all chapters are closed in time, there is still the process of ratifying the Accession Treaty, which in itself can take 6-18 months. For the EU, Montenegrin accession should be an easy decision. The country is a small, pro-EU, NATO member that is geographically continuous and already uses the euro. Precisely because of this, it is a test-case for the incoming round of EU enlargement, and any seemingly unjust delay from Brussels could damage EU credibility with the other applicants. If Montenegro delivers reform but Brussels does not deliver membership then the signal sent to other candidates is that membership is not conditional on reform delivery after all.

Albania:

Albania has become the second strongest candidate for EU membership, behind only Montenegro. The EU decoupled Albania’s application from North Macedonia’s in 2024, allowing Albania to advance at an unprecedented rate – opening all six negotiation clusters in 13 months. No chapters have yet been closed, but this is because Albania is still awaiting a positive IBAR regarding Chapters 23 and 24. This is expected by late 2026 at the earliest. Albania has the highest public approval of EU accession out of any candidate, at 91% according to the September 2025 Eurobarometer survey. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has called for a 2030 accession date, which is plausible if there are no undue delays, although a 2031 accession date may be more likely. This is due to concern that administrative capacity and the depth of rule-of-law reforms may slow chapter closures.

Ukraine:

Although Ukraine is the strategic priority for the EU, it must still adhere to accession procedure. Ukraine applied for EU membership on 28 February 2022, days after the start of the war with Russia, with formal negotiations beginning in 2024. It has already made progress, including: reforming its justice system, developing a functioning market economy, tackling money laundering, modernising public administration and protecting national minorities. Zelenskyy has made an especially ambitious goal of joining the EU by 2027, the closest date on this list. However, no clusters have been formally opened so far (although the Danish Presidency in 2025 gave Ukraine technical access to begin working on three clusters). This is largely due to Orbán blocking the opening of the first cluster for Ukraine, citing issues of Hungarian minority rights in Ukraine. Magyar has already signalled some openness to working with Ukraine, although he maintained the issue of Hungarian minorities in Transcarpathia. The EU has made it a requirement for Ukraine to implement a plan to protect these minority Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians and Romanians in Ukraine. Assuming that the Hungarian veto will be lifted by Magyar and Ukraine can begin closing chapters, the 2027 target is still especially ambitious. The war is the primary issue, and although it doesn’t legally block the EU from granting Ukraine membership under Article 49, it would be politically unpalatable for several members. It would also introduce a series of legal challenges for Ukraine, such as CFSP alignment, territorial scope and mutual defence implications under Article 42(7). Whilst this is not a NATO Article 5 equivalent, it would create an “obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” for each of the EU27, which they have not collectively committed to. This introduces the question of whether it is desirable to let Ukraine join in these circumstances at all. Diplomatic circles have instead suggested that the current time target is not credible, and that a 2028-2030 range is the earliest conceivable date. German Chancellor Merz suggested that 2027 or even 2028 is not realistic. Germany and France instead proposed a system of Associate Membership, interim EU membership without voting rights. Zelenskyy has already rejected this proposal, instead calling for full membership. As such, it is likely that Ukraine may be delayed until the 2030s for full membership.

Moldova:

Moldova applied for EU membership shortly after Ukraine did, in March 2022. Both applications became coupled together when they were granted candidate status together in June 2022. Negotiations opened in June 2024, but since then no clusters have formally been opened. This is because Hungary’s veto on Ukraine’s cluster openings also blocked Moldova since the Council has treated the two as a package. There has been some debate about decoupling Moldova’s application from Ukraine, as there are no disagreements between the EU27 and Moldova, but this proposal has been rejected so far. Nevertheless, Moldova has worked to make gains towards EU membership, with the pro-EU PAS party winning an outright majority in the 2025 elections – despite extensive Russian interference. The EU has also approved the Moldova growth plan, a EUR 1.9 billion investment of grants and loans into Moldova to enhance investment into the country following reform success. This is the most significant pre-accession financial commitment of any candidate. The most significant issue is Transnistria, a Russia-aligned breakaway region. The reintegration of Transnistria into Moldova would be the preferred outcome for Brussels, to avoid an instance where the contested territory is excluded from EU membership. Regardless, Moldova has made significant strides towards EU standards, especially in terms of its democracy. Initial time targets for EU membership are 2028, but this is again dependent on Magyar dropping the Hungarian veto, the situation in Ukraine and any other delays. A 2029-2030 accession date may be more likely.

North Macedonia:

North Macedonia finds itself in the unique situation where its own accession to the EU is not especially related to its own shortcomings. It has already changed its name in 2019 to settle a dispute with Greece, joined NATO and delivered reforms since it became a candidate in 2005. Not a single chapter has been opened in the two decades since. The delay traces back to the now-resolved Greek veto and the ongoing Bulgarian veto. Bulgaria has demanded that the Bulgarian community be included as a constitutive minority in the Macedonian constitution and be given additional protections. Alongside this, Bulgaria has also accused North Macedonia of misrepresenting their shared history, and urges additional educational reform and has moved to extend conditions further to historical and linguistic questions. North Macedonia has been hesitant to commit to this without a guarantee that Bulgaria will then drop its veto without issuing further demands. Macedonian Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski has refused to amend the constitution to include Bulgarians as a constitutive minority, pledging that there would be no constitutional changes during his term. Unless North Macedonia concedes this change, or Brussels moves to pressure Bulgaria to drop its veto, there is no foreseeable path to opening negotiations.

Serbia:

Whilst the Serbian accession process is formally underway, it is practically stalled by Vučić. Accession negotiations began in 2014 and 22 chapters have been opened, but only 2 provisionally closed. No chapters have been opened or closed since December 2021. Vučić suggested in May 2026 that Serbia could become an EU member by 2028, but this will not happen. Structural issues include democratic backsliding, concerns about media freedom, disagreements with the EU about Russian sanctions and the Kosovo question. IRI polling also suggests that only 39% would vote for EU membership in a referendum. Serbian society has become increasingly polarised and reforms have slowed since the November 2024 protest movement that has escalated in recent weeks. These protests began in response to the 2024 Novi Sad canopy collapse which killed 16 people, a tragedy blamed on issues of corruption and state negligence towards infrastructure projects. Vučić has now made concessions to the student protestors that there will be parliamentary elections at the end of the year, and that he will not contest the presidential election citing constitutional limits. The Serbian opposition is genuinely fragmented, and the protestor-led pro-EU Student List is the most popular but least organised of them. Early polling suggested that the Student List could even beat Vučić’s SNS. We would need to see how the protests are resolved and who wins the incoming election before concluding Serbia’s accession timetable, but it seems clear that a SNS victory would extend the freeze of accession negotiations, whilst an opposition victory may restart it. Either way, serious structural barriers remain.

The United Kingdom:

The UK famously became the first member to leave the EU under Article 50 as a result of their 2016 Brexit referendum, where 51.89% voted in favour of leaving. Almost 10 years later, the public opinion has shifted in favour of rejoining the EU, with a 2025 YouGov poll recording 55% in favour (although this drops to 36% in a scenario where the euro and Schengen must both be adopted). Whilst the current government under Starmer has ruled out rejoining the EU, it has sought out several measures to reset relations. This was realised in the May 2025 EU-UK summit, where the EU and UK underlined shared values, and agreed a new strategic partnership, security and defence partnership, UK access to SAFE and a possibility for closer cooperation under the Common Understanding agreement, which includes a UK return to ERASMUS+ and a potential youth mobility scheme, among more. Unlike the other candidates in this piece, the UK is not an EU applicant or candidate. A serious movement to rejoin would technically be faster due to the UK’s previous familiarity with the EU, although the UK may not be granted previous opt-outs, and may therefore be required to accept the euro and Schengen under Article 49.

Starmer is experiencing a severe leadership crisis with nearly 100 Labour MPs calling for his resignation following their catastrophic local election results, which introduces the debate as to who could replace him. The favourite is Andy Burnham, the popular Mayor of Manchester who is seeking election as an MP in the Makerfield by-election on 18 June. Polls suggest that he would win a potential Labour leadership election, although he must first win his seat in the by-election, which is contested with Reform. Burnham has stated that whilst he hopes that the UK will return to the EU in his lifetime, he would not pursue it as Prime Minister. This is likely due to the growing influence of Reform in politics, who have emerged as Labour’s most significant opponent and are running on anti-immigration policies. The salience of Reform’s anti-migrant rhetoric draws on the same political coalition as the previous Brexit referendum, which therefore discourages many of the pro-EU Labour members from taking the membership question more seriously as it has become politically unviable. Other potential Labour leadership contenders, such as Wes Streeting, have called for the UK to rejoin the EU. However, May 2026 polling suggests that he would lose decisively to Starmer, so there is no strong prospect of him winning a future leadership election. Either way, debate over EU membership is promising for deeper UK-EU cooperation in the future, even if it is not seriously pursued yet.

Iceland:

Iceland is the dark horse in the question of EU membership. The nation is set to have a referendum on EU membership on 29 August 2026 on whether to resume negotiations by 2027, after asking in 2015 to no longer be considered an applicant. For context, Iceland had opened 27 chapters and provisionally closed 11 before withdrawing. Initial polls suggest that the majority of respondents would vote against resuming negotiations, with 47% voting against compared to 40% voting for. Trump’s hostility against Greenland has pushed Iceland to reconsider membership in the face of geopolitical uncertainty. Inflation reaching 5.4% in March 2026 has also emerged as a key consideration for the referendum; the euro would offer more stability than the krona. Iceland is already highly qualified to join as an EEA member, NATO member with Schengen Associate status and one of the strongest democracies and GDP-per capita ratings in the world. The historical barrier to Icelandic membership has been a disagreement regarding the Common Fisheries Policy. For Iceland, this is an issue of sovereignty, and was one of the primary reasons for negotiations collapsing in 2013. The EU has proposed some flexibility here, which may help to resolve the long-standing issue. If Iceland votes yes then it is possible that we may see Iceland joining the EU as soon as 2028 – according to Iceland’s Foreign Minister Þorgerður Katrín Gunnarsdóttir. If they vote no then the question of membership will be closed for another generation.

The EU is soon approaching a new period of enlargement, but the accession framework is being rewritten in real time. Montenegro is the most likely country to obtain EU membership, due to its advanced position in the process. It has become the test case for whether Brussels can deliver EU enlargement, after over a decade of significant caution post-2013, with the conditions of Montenegro’s membership likely acting as a template for the other candidates. The EU continues to debate QMV regulations, rule-of-law conditionality and potential Associate Status for the countries seeking EU accession. Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Moldova are all expected to complete their accession processes in the near future, whilst North Macedonia and Serbia are frozen in the process. The UK and Iceland have the potential to emerge as surprise candidates, although this is far more likely for Iceland as the UK is unlikely to reapply this decade. The deeper story is that institutional reform and EU enlargement are no longer separable. The existing unanimity approach is structurally incompatible with the total enlargement workload, which risks slowing enlargement beyond the publicly outlined timeframes.

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On 12 April Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party suffered a significant defeat in Hungary’s general election, resulting in the opposition Tisza party winning a supermajority with 141/199 seats. This marks one of the European Union’s most consequential elections in recent history as Orbán loses power to a pro-EU challenger after 16 years in office. Péter Magyar, the incoming Hungarian Prime Minister, ran on issues of anti-corruption, economic reform, democracy and repairing relationships with Brussels. The last point is the most important here, and it is the reason why so many people across the world were watching the election in Budapest. Brussels is especially keen to reset this relationship, and to bring Hungary back into alignment with the voting patterns of the other EU26 countries. Under Orbán, Hungary has exercised its veto to become the sole dissenting vote or the effective sole blocker of 21 European Council decisions – with the most significant opposition centred around aid to Ukraine and Ukrainian accession, as well as Russian sanctions. Magyar is now tasked with reforming Hungary in time to receive EUR 16.7 billion of frozen funding by the end of the summer.

Much of the initial post-electoral focus was on the Hungarian veto of the EU’s EUR 90 billion loan for Ukraine, as well as the 20^th sanctions package for Russia. Magyar quickly spoke in favour of passing these, although it was Orban’s government who dropped their technical vetoes to allow both to pass. This follows the reopening of the Druzhba Pipeline on 21-22 April, which supplies Hungary and Slovakia with Russian oil via Ukraine. As a result, both measures were passed. The loan to Ukraine features EUR 30 billion for macroeconomic support and EUR 60 billion for industrial defence investments. The 20th sanctions package is arguably the most consequential package in the last two years, delivering 120 new individual listings and key economic sanctions surrounding the Russian energy sector and shadow fleet. Additionally, a new anti-circumvention tool which bans certain key EU exports to Kyrgyzstan (as to not be imported to Russia from there) has been introduced.

Although Magyar did not overturn the veto himself, his suggestions that he would do so are still promising for the broader Hungary-EU relations reset. Magyar will not be sworn in until 9 May (Europe Day), but the EU has already sent a delegation to meet with him. Ursula von der Leyen’s Chief of Staff Björn Seibert met with Magyar’s team on 17-18 April to discuss the now-resolved Ukrainian loan/Russian sanctions package and the timeline for how Hungary can move forward to unlock EU funds earmarked for Hungary that have been frozen due to corruption and rule of law concerns. Notably, Tisza and the European Commission have quietly confirmed that the frozen fund release is not linked to sanctions cooperation, a measure designed to push Hungary for quick political reform. For Magyar, the timing is tighter than it looks. He has approximately 130 days between his swearing in and the 31 August Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) deadline. This deadline is very unlikely to be extended, and must be met in order to secure the EUR 16.7 billion which has been earmarked for Hungary, split across cohesion funds (EUR 6.3 billion) and RRF funds (EUR 10.4 billion). In order to realise this money, which would account for approximately 8% of Hungary’s GDP, the country must hit 27 super-milestones, which consist of anti-corruption reform, the restoration of the rule of law, media freedom and restoring fundamental rights.

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Magyar has so far named ten of his planned sixteen ministers, whilst also demanding that several of the key Orbán era office holders resign by 31 May or face removal via the supermajority. It is vital that Magyar moves quickly to remove Fidesz influence in order to push for the necessary political reforms to unlock the frozen EU funding by the 31 August deadline. Notably, András Kármán, Tisza’s lead figure on financial policy has remarked that the conditions for Hungary to join the Eurozone could likely be created by 2030, following an assessment of the state of Hungary’s public finances. Kármán also spoke about the economic benefit of the euro’s adoption for Hungary, given the country’s deep integration within the euro area economy.

Restoring the rule of law to a strong level will be one of the most effective ways to demonstrate that Hungary is aligning itself with the EU, in order to end the Article 7(1) procedure against Hungary and to help secure the EUR 16.7 billion in frozen funding. Magyar has stressed this point by stating that Hungary will reverse Orbán’s decision to leave the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2025 – a move that broke with the common EU position on the ICC and the Rome Statute, which all EU members have ratified. Orbán’s government refused to arrest Netanyahu on his visit in 2025, an ICC requirement. This is a move that Magyar has promised not to repeat. On 21 April, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has also found that Hungary infringed on Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, the first country to ever do so, with its 2021 Child Protection Act as this was found to have stigmatised against LGBTQ communities. 16 EU countries (Including Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands) and the European Parliament intervened in the case against Hungary by backing the legality of the Article 2 hearing – a genuinely historic ruling. Magyar has not publicly committed to repealing the law, despite commentators suggesting that his pro-EU stance is only credible if he does. This silence from Magyar is likely due to the contention of the topic domestically, with Fidesz in opposition ready to push the topic as a culture-war talking point. Other necessary reforms include EPPO accession, whistleblower architecture, judicial appointments and a media law. Magyar is depending on the EU fund release in order to maintain his domestic popularity, but a release of funds that is too sudden risks undermining the momentum needed to bring about these reforms in the first place.

Initial reactions to the Hungarian election were mixed. Russia has quietly accepted that the election is a strategic loss that cannot be reversed. Moscow initially stated that they would be happy to work with Magyar pragmatically, although this quickly devolved into Putin’s spokesperson Peskov calling Hungary an “unfriendly country” (Russia’s standard designation for EU countries since 2022), as Hungary moved to support the latest sanctions package. Moscow’s relationship is with Orbán himself, and as it cannot be easily transferred across to Tisza, it ends with Orbán. As such, Moscow’s reaction is managed disappointment. Their most significant European ally has been lost and they must now depend on leveraging energy supplies to the region. This has already begun with the planned 1 May Russian suspension of Kazakh oil transit via the Druzhba’s northern branch. German authorities have responded by assuring that there will be no disruption to energy security, but the move is seen as retaliation to the latest package of sanctions.

Washington’s response is notably absent. Vice President Vance made a high-profile appearance in Budapest to help support Orbán’s campaign, an unusual deployment for a sitting Vice President. This marks the significance of the Trump- Orbán relationship, and may be why the US has not congratulated Magyar on his victory as the result is seen as a defeat for the MAGA aligned European right. The Trump administration’s focus on Hungary has always been due to Orbán, not due to any structural factors. As such this is will not be transferred to Magyar, or even to Fidesz as an opposition party. A notable point to consider here is the Lukoil waiver which Orbán secured in November 2025. This is an exemption for Hungary to import oil from Lukoil and Rosneft, two sanctioned Russian energy companies. Orbán had claimed that this exemption would be indefinite, but White House sources suggest that this was for a one-year fixed term, expiring November 2026. Since the Trump administration has no attachment to Magyar, it is unlikely that they will move to extend this exemption. The Trump administration continues to move towards a more transactional relationship with European governments, looking to deal with whomever can deliver on US interests. These developments have been especially significant for the European right-wing parties, many of who met in Milan on 18 April as part of the Patriots for Europe rally. Orbán was notably absent, and was not replaced by a Fidesz delegation. American tariffs and the Russia-Ukraine conflict continue to divide the broader right-wing movement, leaving each member to answer to domestic pressures rather than form a coordinated external outlook.

Poland will perhaps be Hungary’s most important ally in Magyar’s quest to restore relations with the EU. He has spoken about a special relationship between Hungary and Poland, which has been seriously tested in recent years. For example, Orbán’s Hungary has given political asylum to two Polish ministers wanted at home. Magyar has already stated that they are not welcome and will not remain in Hungary for long. Both countries celebrate 23 March as the day of Hungarian-Polish Friendship and Magyar has announced that his first international visit will be to Warsaw, likely as a means to urgently repair this relationship. Poland’s Tusk reacted the most enthusiastically of any EU leader, calling Magyar to say “I’m so happy, I think I am even happier than you.” Poland and Hungary have both been struck with Article 7 violations, and Tusk managed to end the Polish Article 7 procedure in May 2024, after 18 months in office. Should Hungary follow the Polish playbook, it is likely that they will also be able to overturn their Article 7 procedure in the years to come.

Slovakia’s Fico reacted the most cautiously. Without Orbán, Fico will become increasingly politically exposed as he can no longer depend on Hungarian cover. Progressive Slovakia is beating Fico’s SMER 20% to 18% in polls, also making Fico more restrained from confrontations as he lacks domestic approval. As a result, it is likely that Slovakia will shift towards greater pragmatism, caution and a less obstructionist posture rather than a full reversal of Eurosceptic policy. Tusk also suggested that “especially after Orban’s defeat, he won’t pose a major problem” for the EU. Magyar and Fico shared a tense call on 21 April, relating to the Beneš Decrees, which expropriated Germans and Hungarians in post-war Czechoslovakia. Fico’s government had moved to tighten legislation around these decrees by making it a criminal offence to question them. Meanwhile, Magyar is moving to secure minority rights for Hungarian-Slovaks by pushing for Slovakia to repeal this legislation. Fico instead remained more focused on energy policy and the Druzhba restart.

Bulgaria’s reaction was bifurcated due to its own election a week later, in which it elected Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria party. Radev is seen as pro-Russian and has criticised EU sanctions on Russia, instead calling for more constructive dialogue with the Kremlin. As a result, many were quick to compare Radev with Orbán, however it is very unlikely that he will be in any way as significant of a blocker for the EU as Orbán has been. This is due to Radev inheriting a position that is structurally weaker than Orbán’s. He commands a 131-seat simple majority, not a supermajority, and can therefore not control courts, the central bank or the prosecutor’s office in a way that Orbán could. Furthermore, Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria is a very young party, with no established media presence comparable to that of Fidesz. Bulgaria is also the EU’s poorest member, has already adopted the euro and depends financially on the EU for its rearmament, which is funded entirely through SAFE. This makes potential confrontation with Brussels unlikely, especially since Pro-European public opinion sits high at 56% in the country – preventing the use of systematic vetoes that were used by Orbán.

Magyar inherits a reformable Hungary, not a reformed one. The 31 August deadline will be a critical stress test for him to implement significant political reform to unlock the frozen funding held by the EU. Significant rule-of-law reforms are required to reassure the EU of change, but both Brussels and Budapest need this to go well. The November 2026 Lukoil waiver expiry is another key date to watch for, as it is unlikely to be extended if the Trump administration sees little value in Magyar succeeding Orbán.

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In 1970 the UN General Assembly formally adopted the 0.7% Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending target for economically advantaged countries. This was revised somewhat in later years to 0.7% of Gross National Income (from GDP). However, despite this commitment, only a few countries have ever maintained this 0.7% foreign aid target – and currently only four do. The growing politicisation of foreign aid has increased in recent years following Western cost of living debates, suggesting that less money should be sent abroad. This decision to reduce foreign aid to the developing world has already resulted in severe humanitarian crises which are compounded further with rising energy, fertiliser and food costs following the US-Iran war. This article will examine the existing donor agreements, map out predicted casualties from foreign aid cuts and examine the growing politicisation of foreign aid spending.

A recent article by The Lancet suggested that a mild reduction in ODA could result in the deaths of 9.4 million people (including 2.5 million children under five), whilst a severe defunding scenario could result in as many as 22.6 million deaths (including 5.4 million children under five) by 2030. This follows announcements that several of the top Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are cutting their ODA, bringing their combined all-time high 2023 levels of USD 223.7 billion down to USD 214.6 billion in 2024. Preliminary data for 2025 will be released on 9 April. The severe modelling from The Lancet follows announcements that many of the top donor countries are further reducing their ODA funding. The USAID funding cuts are the most significant here, with an estimated 40% reduction and an 83% reduction of it’s programmes, following the July 2025 announcement. The Lancet study suggests that the closure of USAID will account for 14.1 million deaths (including 4.5 million children under five) by 2030. However, it is important to note that these ODA cuts are widely unsupported in the US, and that US Congress has approved a USD 50 billion foreign aid bill. This is still a 16% reduction from the 2025 level, yet it does help to address some of the most severe concerns despite the overall significant reduction. On 20 March the US announced the creation of a new Bureau aimed at responding to emergencies and humanitarian crises across the world. However, this new bureau is only funded with USD 5.4 billion annually, and will be far more selective in which projects are funded.

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Other significant reductions include the UK, who have further reduced their ODA to 0.3% by 2027/28 from 0.5% in 2024 (approximately a £6.5 billion reduction) citing the need for increased defence spending. The UK is an interesting example here, as they are one of the few countries to put their 0.7% ODA commitment into law, rather than simply keeping it as a political obligation – hence a lot of the subsequent controversy following the reduction. The German ODA budget has also been significantly reduced in the last few years, with the money allocated to the BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) falling from EUR 11.08 billion in 2023 to EUR 10.05 billion in 2026. It is projected that this will fall to EUR 9.3 billion by 2028. Other German ODA ministries have also had their budgets cut considerably.

Germany and other European countries have stated that this shift in spending is due to a refocus on Europe, especially Ukraine. This shift began in 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine where European security was explicitly prioritised. As of 31 December 2025, Germany has made available or earmarked approximately EUR 39 billion for bilateral civilian support and approximately EUR 55 billion for military assistance. In addition to this, Germany has been a key partner in providing political aid with providing security guarantees and support for Ukraine’s political accession to the European Union. Said simply, these are all resources that cannot also be used to support traditional beneficiaries in the Global South. Refugee hosting is also significant, with 4.38 million Ukrainians claiming temporary protection in EU countries. Germany and Poland host the most, with 1,260,230 and 965,990 respectively. The cost of hosting these refugees is included within total ODA figures for several Western countries (e.g. UK, Sweden, Netherlands), therefore inflating headline aid numbers and diverting resources that otherwise would have been sent to developing countries.

Here is a chart presenting the current state of ODA expenditure:

Who is Impacted the Most?

Impacts from this sudden reduction in ODA are widespread across the developing world, with immediate major increases in malnutrition and disease – such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and cholera reported. There are also less immediate consequences, such as reductions in social programmes and education spending. The single largest loser from these ODA reductions is Ethiopia, which had received USD 4.52 billion in total ODA in 2023 – USD 1.619 billion of which came from the US. As a result, 85% of Ethiopia’s nonprofits have paused operations in 2025, with 5000 health care workers losing their jobs. Cases of malaria have also increased from 900,000 in 2019 to over 7 million in 2024. West and Central Africa in particular is experiencing significant malnutrition and food insecurity. The World Food Programme (WFP) has reported that 55 million people (including 13 million children) there are expected to endure crisis-levels of hunger during the June-August 2026 season. In Nigeria, the WFP will only be able to serve 72,000 people in February – a huge reduction from the 1.3 million people assisted during 2025. Sudan is quickly spiralling into the world’s worst humanitarian disaster due to the ongoing war and this cut in foreign aid assistance. 30 million people are now facing a humanitarian emergency here. Other countries that were dependent on PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) funding have also been let down. Initial disruptions resulted in healthcare workers being dismissed, projects being cancelled and the potential reversal of key progress made in the fight against HIV/AIDS. It is now proposed that the funding for PEPFAR is to be phased out, with the idea that the majority of recipient countries become self-reliant by 2030. In terms of aid lost as an equivalent to 2023 GNI levels, Micronesia is set to suffer the most losing 11.2%, followed by Somalia at 6.1%, Afghanistan at 5% and the Central African Republic at 3.7%. The largest share of these cuts is from the US reduction, although the European re-allocation of aid is also noteworthy.

It had initially been expected that many of the worst affected countries would quickly re-allocate their resources to meet these humanitarian demands. However, this has not meaningfully materialised for many of those affected. In Ethiopia’s case, the government had planned to better utilise domestic resources, Public-Private Partnerships and alternative donor engagement. Despite this, many are left without aid and refugees are facing increasing food insecurity following the WFP’s critical funding shortage. The situation is similar in Somalia, where 6.7 million people now face an escalating hunger crisis following aid cuts, conflict and a severe drought. The EU has announced an additional EUR 63 million relief package, whilst the US has resumed aid delivery following a resolution to the suspension in January 2026.

Naturally, these predictions do not include the compounding pressure of the Iran War. Trade through the Strait of Hormuz remains collapsed, which has consequently resulted in surging energy and fertiliser costs as shipping remains disrupted. This restricts the trade of 27% of the world’s oil, 20% of global liquified natural gases and 20-30% of global fertiliser exports. The prices of urea, for example, have increased over 70% since the start of the war, causing concern that many farmers will not have sufficient access to fertilisers in the growing season. Even if the war ended immediately, it could take months/years for energy and fertiliser prices to drop to normal levels. As a result, it has been predicted that up to 323 million people will experience food insecurity if the crisis continues. The World Bank suggests that the conflict will be directly responsible for 45 million additional people who are pushed into acute hunger by mid-2026.

The Politicisation of Foreign Aid

Unfortunately, the decision to provide foreign aid is often reduced to the idea that money is simply given away to other countries. This idea is especially common among more populist political parties, who often run on pledges to reduce ODA spending further and invest the difference domestically. As an example, the UK’s Reform party running on a plan to cap ODA at £1 billion(or about 0.03% of GDP), a significant reduction from the approximate £9 billion spent today. A 2025 study found that far-right governments reduced spending to international organisations by almost 30%. Even if these parties do not achieve political office, their public criticism of ODA spending may contribute to its reduction when strategic objectives demand budget change.

The issue here is that this minimises the positive benefits of foreign aid spending, such as stabilising neighbouring states and developing trade/cultural relationships, preventing large-scale refugee flows and establishing soft power internationally. The security concerns associated with instable neighbouring states are often overlooked with aid cuts and may prove more costly in the long run, should a real crisis emerge. An important caveat is also that if the decision is made to reduce ODA spending, then it is best done in a controlled reduction over time, rather than an abrupt stop all at once. This was seen when the US closed USAID in 2025 and overwhelmed many recipient countries at once, rather than introduce a more reasonable long-term plan to ensure stability. It is also increasingly common for ODA to come with political conditions. As a result, the distinction between geopolitical conditionality (such as South Africa’s ICJ Stance) and ideological conditionality (DEI, Gender Identity etc.) is becoming increasingly blurred for the Trump Administration.

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Following the continued US-Israeli offensive against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has become instrumental for Iran to create international pressure in an attempt to end the war. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) confirmed that the strait was closed on the 2 March, with threats to set ships on fire that violate the order. US-Israeli forces are attempting to gather support to form a naval coalition to forcefully re-open the strait, but allies remain hesitant to directly involve themselves. Iran has attempted to mine the strait in order to complicate the re-opening of the strait, with US-Israeli forces striking the mining ships directly – eliminating 16 by 10 March. Nevertheless, the crisis has created significant supply shocks that will reshape global energy markets in the short-medium term.

The most obvious of these consequences will be the surging price of oil. The price of Brent Crude reached upwards of $100 for the first time since 2022, with peaks nearly 50% more expensive when compared with prices before the war began. An IRGC Spokesperson has claimed that this will go as high as $200 if the war continues. Wholesale gas prices have also reached EUR 52 per megawatt hour, compared to EUR 30 before the war. Whilst the strait of Hormuz controls 20% of the world’s oil supplies, the price increase is not entirely attributed to its closure.

Iran has worked to tactically strike major oil and gas refineries, terminals, storage sites and production facilities, with IRGCN Commander issuing a statement stating that oil facilities associated with America are now on par with American bases and will come under fire with full force. As such, the UAE has reported that a drone has struck the Shah natural gas field and set it on fire. It has been closed as a precaution to assess damage. This gas field is the world’s largest ultra-sour gas operation, with capacity to produce 1.28 bn standard cubic feet of gas a day, as well as 5% of the world’s granulated sulphur. Additionally, a tanker was struck off the major oil port of Fujairah, causing a fire. Operations have been halted here which disrupts the port’s usual export of 1m barrels per day. As a result, the UAE’s daily crude output has halved when compared to export levels before the war. Similar strikes have taken place in Qatar where Iranian drones targeted Qatar Energy (the world’s largest liquified natural gas (LNG) producer) in Ras Laffan, causing them to declare a force majeure on gas contracts on 4 March. This is arguably the single most significant strike on the region’s energy infrastructure as Qatar is one of the world’s top LNG suppliers, and the plant would take a month to reopen. The Ras Tanura oil refinery in Saudi Arabia was also forced to halt operations following a fire caused by a drone strike interception, whilst their Shaybah oilfield has also been targeted. As a result, Saudi Arabia has increasingly been working to divert exports to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, although this pipeline only has a limited capacity and cannot fully accommodate the output previously destined for Hormuz. Multiple strikes have also been recorded in Fujairah, UAE and in Duqm, Oman. This suggests that even routes bypassing the strait of Hormuz cannot be used completely safely. Iraq has gone as far as to try to export oil via Turkey. It is also worth noting that US-Israeli forces have also focused strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure, further compounding the issue of energy insecurity. Kharg Island has stood out here, with Trump ordering significant strikes on Iran’s oil export hub. As a result, total oil/crude flows have dropped from approximately 20 million barrels per day to about 10 million barrels per day.

As a countermeasure, the IEA has announced the largest ever oil stock release, with 400 million barrels being earmarked for release from emergency reserves. Future releases may follow if needed. Fuel rationing has begun in countries with low domestic reserves, and a high dependence on Gulf oil, such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, with other countries urging austerity measures to reduce consumption. Europe remains more insulated here as only 3.8% of gas imports arrive to Europe from Qatar. The Russia-Ukraine war was a huge wakeup call for the EU’s energy security, and as such significant stockpiles and energy diversification measures have worked to protect the continent in ways that Asia is missing. Nevertheless, increased demand from Asia will still impact the European cost of living, but at an economic level rather than as a question of energy security – at least in the short-medium term. However, Europe’s gas stockpiles going into 2026 were significantly lower than those recorded in previous years, increasing sensitivity to these energy shocks.

It is also worth noting that these strikes have resulted in a huge increase in ship insurance costs for the region. A pre-war insurance cost only around 0.02-0.05% of the ship’s value, whilst it can now cost up to 5%. The US has announced a $20bn reinsurance programme to help revive shipping through the Gulf, as well as temporarily suspending the Jones Act, a shipping law which requires the transport of goods between American ports to be conducted by American-flagged vessels. This is likely another attempt to stabilise the oil price in the short term.

Perhaps the most underreported effect of this crisis is the blockade of fertilisers. The Gulf states produce much of the world’s fertilisers, with approximately one third of the world’s supply transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The most important fertilisers are nitrogen-based products such as urea, which is synthesised from natural gases. This naturally has a compounding effect, as urea production plants across the world will have to reduce outputs following the surging price of natural gas. For example, India produces almost a fifth of the world’s urea/phosphate fertilisers and purchases approximately 40% of its natural gas from the Middle East. Huge price increases in food, as well as very real prospects of food insecurity in the world’s developing countries can be expected, where half of the cost of producing wheat is already spent on fertilisers. Alongside this, the region also exports huge amounts of sulphur which is used to produce phosphates. Morocco will be especially affected here as they control 70% of the world’s phosphate reserves, which must be processed with sulphuric acid in order to become a viable fertiliser. As the Middle East accounts for approximately 44% of the world’s seaborne sulphur trade, it will not be an easy task to find an alternative when countries such as China also have a huge demand.

In order to alleviate these very real global food and energy insecurity concerns, it is vital that the strait of Hormuz be reopened as quickly as possible. However, this is easier said than done. The IRGC has realised that this has become a war for their survival and that by closing the strait of Hormuz they have the power to create international pressure on Trump to seek an end to the war and a return to normalcy. Trump, on the other hand, has weighed forcefully reopening the strait with military presence, involving a potential international coalition and military escorts for tankers and cargo ships. However, international partners are not keen to involve themselves, with spokespeople from NATO countries suggesting politely that this is an American war, not a NATO war. It is also not so clear what Trump hopes to achieve from involving European navies here, the US Navy is already dominant in the region, so this may simply be a means to improve the legitimacy of the war by involving other Western powers. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the US will do this independently as they have not yet begun to escort ships as suggested by their Defence Secretary. Notably, the US-Israeli forces have also assassinated Larijani, one of Iran’s de-facto leaders following Khamenei’s incapacitation, on 17 March. Further escalating the war with the IRGC Leadership.

Russia is the natural beneficiary of this Iran war. Surging energy prices massively benefit the Russian economy, much of which will naturally feed into their war effort with Ukraine. The US has also quietly lifted sanctions on Russian oil, at least temporarily, to help with the energy shock. This is a move that is heavily criticised by European leaders, for whom the Ukrainian conflict is much more strategically important. As expected, Ukraine may also suffer from a reduced supply of Western arms following the continuation of the conflict. The EU has remained committed to banning Russian oil/gas, remaining committed to earlier agreements. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban is naturally quick to criticise this, calling for the EU to suspend sanctions. Nevertheless, Von Der Leyen made a statement saying that it would be a strategic blunder to return to Russian oil.

It has also been reported that Italy and France are in negotiations with Iran to allow their ships passage through the strait of Iran. France has acknowledged open communication channels with Iran, whilst Italy has denied direct negotiations. EU Military action has so far has consisted only of individual member states sending ships and aircraft to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea as a defensive move to protect Cyprus. It is possible, but unlikely, that a mission similar to the ASPIDES and ATALANTA operations may be expanded to the Gulf, although nothing official has been confirmed. Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief, has indicated that this could be consisted of a “coalition of the willing”. The EU is set to have a leadership summit on 19 March to address the conflict, and a more coherent strategy announcement is expected afterwards. The EU has also activated their crisis management framework across multiple Directorate-Generals in order to coordinate humanitarian assistance, focus on internal and cyber security, as well as to prepare for significant migrant flows into Europe. The UNHCR has estimated that 3.2 million Iranians have become displaced so far, as per their report on 12 March. The Iranian crisis is not just a new cost of living crisis for the EU, but a real test of strategic autonomy, with every policy that the EU has implemented since 2022 to reduce energy dependence being stress tested at once.

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Early on Saturday 28^th February, the United States and Israel began their bombing campaign of Iran as part of Operation Epic Fury. These initial strikes were particularly destructive as they claimed the lives of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, as well a total of 48 Iranian leaders in one strike - as per a statement by Trump. This attack has erupted the region into significant conflict, as Iran has expanded the conflict by striking territory and/or military bases owned by Bahrain, France, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Syria, UAE, United Kingdom and United States. This article will serve to recap some of the major events and significant reported casualties across the conflict so far.

Iran:

As expected, Iran has suffered the most significant destruction from any country in this list. The US and Israel have claimed responsibility for striking key leadership figures across the country. Most notably, this includes: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Army Chief of Staff General Mousavi, Defence Minister Nasirzadeh, Major General Pakpour and Shamkhani, a top security adviser to Khamenei. Iranian media confirms that these strikes also killed members of Khamenei’s immediate family, whilst the IDF claims to have also killed the heads of the Military Bureau, Intelligence Directorate of the Khatam al Anbiya emergency command, SPND (Organisation of Defensive Innovation and Research) and Reza Mozaffari-Nia, a former head of SPND and former deputy defence minister. Iran has convened a Council of Experts in the city of Qom, in order to appoint a new Supreme Leader for the country. However, Israel has also struck the building in which the votes were being counted. It is not clear how many of the council’s 88 members were present at the time. It has now been reported that Khamenei’s eldest son Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei has been elected as the new Supreme Leader of Iran. Trump has made it no secret that he seeks regime change, although there is doubt about who would be picked to lead Iran in the case of an American victory. One of the more obvious choices is Iran’s exiled Crown Prince, Reza Pahlavi. Pahlavi has lived in exile in the United States since 1979, and has said that he is uniquely placed to lead a transitional government as he cannot be associated with the revolution. Trump has announced doubts about Pahlavi, suggesting that someone already inside Iran would be more appropriate, although no alternatives have been named.

The Iranian Red Cresent Society has stated that at least 787 people have been killed since attacks have begun, with 153 counties effected and at least 1,039 attacks recorded in the country. Although, preliminary reports suggest that it is now as much as 1,045 dead. The deadliest single strike in Iran hit a girl’s school in Minab, Southern Iran, with many of the 153+ deaths being children. Israel has also taken responsibility for hitting Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility, as well as Min Zadai – an alleged clandestine nuclear site outside Tehran. Attacks on these sites were a priority for the US and Israel, who used it as a pretext for the war to start with. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have also effectively blocked the Strait of Hormuz, beginning an economic crisis as this disruption affects approximately 20% of the world’s daily oil supply and a significant amount of liquified natural gas (LNG). Trump has released a statement suggesting that the US Navy may begin to escort ships out of the Gulf to ease surging energy prices and economic uncertainty following the rising price of oil.

Trump has also expressed interest in supporting armed militias in Iran. It has also been reported that Kurdish forces in Western Iran have been secretly supplied with weapons smuggled into the country over the last year. Kurdish leaders have requested American/Israeli air support for this operation, although no approval has formally been provided. It is expected that Iraqi Kurdish leaders will be more cautious in joining any explicit conflict against Iran, following Iran’s firm armed response against any nation that they deem hostile, or to be supporting US/Israeli forces.

Israel:

Israel has been a huge player in the war against Iran, inflicting a huge number of strikes alongside the US. They have taken credit for their role in the assassination of Khamenei, as well as other leadership figures, and continue to strike Iranian cities and military bases. Israeli Defence Minister Katz stated that Israel will continue to target Iranian officials as a part of their decapitation doctrine under Operation Roaring Lion. In terms of casualties, Israel has reported that 10 civilians have been killed, 9 of which were struck by an Iranian missile on Beit Shemesh near Jerusalem on 1^st March. The IDF have reported no military casualties so far.

Gulf States:

Perhaps in a bid for survival, Iran has chosen to employ strikes across many of the Arab Gulf States as a means to generate international pressure to dissuade a prolonged conflict by exploiting their vulnerability. As such, Iran fired roughly as many missiles at these Gulf States as it did at Israel during their first wave of strikes, stating that any nation aiding Israel or the US will be deemed a legitimate target. Key US bases and embassies were targeted, as well as civilian and economic sites. Iran has struck US embassies in Riyadh and Kuwait, as well as a US Consulate in Dubai. A $1.1bn US Radar system in Qatar was also destroyed by Iranian strikes. A French naval base in Abu Dhabi was also targeted, although no casualties have been reported.

On 2^nd March, Kuwaiti F/A-18 aircraft shot down three US F-15E Strike Eagles in a friendly fire incident. An investigation has been launched into what has happened, but it has been reported that all US pilots ejected safely. Luxury hotels and the international airport in Dubai have also been targeted by Iranian drones, in a move to economically strike the UAE by targeting tourism directly. The UAE Ministry of Defence has now claimed to have intercepted 876 of 941 Iranian drones, as well as 8 cruise missiles. The UAE, as well as the other Gulf States have affirmed their right to respond to this escalation. For instance, Qatar has downed two Iranian SU-24 fighter jets, whilst there are also conflicting reports about Qatar striking Iran directly.

In terms of economic Impact, Iran has struck several LNG facilities, gas fields and oil refineries. Qatar have announced that they are suspending their LNG production, which constitutes about 20% of the global production. This closure will take about a month to restart, suggesting that the energy shocks of the conflict will be longer lasting, even if the conflict would cease soon.

Lebanon:

Initially, Hezbollah had abstained from involvement in the conflict with Israel and the United States, but quickly became involved once Khamenei had been assassinated. As such, Hezbollah began to launch drones and missiles at Israel and RAF Akrotiri. Israel quickly responded here by launching sweeping strikes and a ground invasion into Southern Lebanon. Notably, Israel claims to have killed Hussein Makled, Hezbollah’s head of intelligence in this strike. Additionally, Lebanon’s government have implemented a ban on Hezbollah – which will be especially difficult to enforce in practice. At the same time, Syria has also worked to reinforce its border with Lebanon with thousands of troops. This serves as an attempt to prevent Hezbollah members from infiltrating Syria during the conflict.

United States:

President Trump gave a statement on the 28^th February, suggesting that the US Military will engage Iran in order to destroy their missiles, missile industry, navy, nuclear programme and regional proxies. So far, the US military have delivered devastating strikes against Iran, in cooperation with Israel, with US Defence Secretary stating that “America is winning decisively”. Trump has set a provisional 4–5-week timeline for the war, although the true length will depend on how significantly the war expands across the Middle East region.

The US CENTCOM has claimed to have destroyed 17 Iranian ships, with some of the more high-profile strikes occurring on the 4^th March. A US Navy submarine was used to sink the IRIS DENA off the coast of Sri Lanka, where it was returning from the multinational MILAN 2026 naval exercises in India. The ship was carrying approximately 180 sailors, with Sri Lankan rescue services saving 32 people and recovering 87 bodies. The remaining sailors are still missing. In Iran, the US has significantly damaged air defences and missile sites across the country, claiming air superiority alongside Israel. NATO air defences have also intercepted an Iranian missile fired towards Turkey, marking a significant escalation of the conflict.

The US have so far lost 6 soldiers, with 10 soldiers suffering from severe injuries. Iran will likely push for more American casualties, as a means of further reducing the American political will for the war. US strikes in Iran are already overwhelmingly unpopular amongst the American public, with just one in four Americans backing the strikes against Iran. A prolonged war is far different from the previous quick strikes that Trump employed against Soleimani in 2020, or against Iran’s nuclear programme in 2025.

Europe:

European nations had notably avoided taking part in the conflict against Iran on the 28^th February, much to the frustration of the United States. Most notably, the United Kingdom initially refused the US access to its military bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia, although Kier Starmer has released a statement on the 2^nd March stating that the US will now be granted full access to UK bases. This hesitation is likely due to the British public being overwhelmingly against involvement in the War, even if this is only to allow the US access to UK bases. Trump has also criticised Starmer here, casting doubt on the UK-US relationship. Since allowing access, the UK’s RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus has been targeted with several drones, likely sent by Hezbollah. The first drone struck the base, causing no casualties and minimum damage, with two other drones being intercepted successfully. As a result, the UK has deployed HMS Duncan and HMS Dragon, alongside helicopters with counter-drone capabilities, to Cyprus to reinforce the RAF base. Greece has also deployed HS Kimon, HS Psara and four F-16 Viper jets to Cyprus, which have already began engaging drones West of Cyprus. Germany and France have also planned to send warships to Cyprus, with France sending their Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, escorted by its air wing and Frigates. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have also issued a joint statement on the matter:

“The Leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom are appalled by the indiscriminate and disproportionate missile attacks launched by Iran against countries in the region, including those who were not involved in initial US and Israeli military operations. Iran’s reckless attacks have targeted our close allies and are threatening our service personnel and our civilians across the region. We call on Iran to stop these reckless attacks immediately.

We will take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region, potentially through enabling necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy Iran’s capability to fire missiles and drones at their source. We have agreed to work together with the US and allies in the region on this matter.”

Spain have notably blocked the US access to use their military bases, citing a lack of desire to involve themselves in the conflict. Trump responded quickly with a call to halt all trade with Spain, a move meant to create economic pressure. However, as an EU member it is not easy to exclude them whilst also upholding existing trade agreements.

Ukraine obviously has a huge amount of experience combating Iran’s Shahed-126 drones, having fought off approximately 57,000 since 2022, and have offered to send advisors to the Middle East to support struggling Gulf States with intercepting Iranian drones. In return, Zelenskyy has urged the Gulf States to use their influence over Russia to press for a one-month ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia has a lot to gain from a prolonged US-Iran war, with energy prices surging and a diversion of Western Aid to the Middle East and away from Ukraine.

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This article is not an exhaustive list, nor does it try to be. Information and new updates are constantly coming out as the situation develops. You are encouraged to do your own research.

Recently, The Norwegian Government has introduced a motion for a massive 600 billion NOK ($56 billion) increase in the nation’s defence spending for the next twelve years with their Long-Term Defence Plan (LTDP). This would nearly double Norway’s annual defence spending, should the Parliament vote to approve the plan. The historic spending increase is following a pattern of militarisation by many NATO members, with this year potentially being Norway’s first-time spending above the 2% NATO target. The LTDP investment is split into replenishing ammunition stockpiles, increasing the size of the Armed Forces, boosting air defence and ordering several new naval vessels. Finance Minister Vedum affirms that these investments do not come at the cost of cutting public services, but can instead benefit the public by producing more jobs and promoting further investments.

“This plan represents a historic boost in defence spending and involves a significant strengthening of all branches of the armed forces.” – Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere

Naval developments constitute the bulk of these investments, with the government ordering five new frigates to replace existing aging frigates, with the potential to acquire an additional large warship in the future via strategic partnerships with NATO partners. Furthermore, the Navy will order an additional submarine to supplement four Type 212CD submarines previously ordered from Germany. 28 smaller vessels will also be ordered for the Navy and the Coast guard, who will receive 16 and 12 respectively for matters of inland coast defence.

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The LTDP also outlines plans to replenish existing equipment, fuel and ammunition stocks, which alone are expected to cost NOK 70 billion. These stocks will be vital to support plans to expand the Army, as several new brigades and battalions are to be created. Brigade Nord will receive a fourth combat battalion, whilst the country also develops a standing brigade in the north of the country and a brigade consisting of reservists in the south. The Armed Forces will move to recruit an additional 4,600 employees over the next twelve years, with a further 4,600 being conscripted for training each year, with a plan to have 13,700 well trained reservists who could be called upon if necessary. This will grow the Home Guard to 45,000 soldiers. Norway will also spend NOK 90 billion on air defence as a part of this plan, with the intension of more than doubling their current air defence capabilities, which are currently limited to the Ørland and Evenes areas. Mobile air defence batteries have been prioritised, with four additional NASAMS being ordered. The Army will also benefit from receiving a battalion equipped with rocket artillery, boasting a far greater range than existing artillery systems, as well as new helicopters.

The LTDP, likely heavily influenced by the Ukraine War, also works to reverse any plans to close earmarked military bases. Instead, each base will be kept open and developed to accommodate the increased equipment and personnel requirements. New soldiers and officers can also expect increased education as a result. International cooperation with NATO partners USA and UK has also resulted in plans for the development and creation of new and existing bases across the country, primarily in the north – presumably due to the proximity to the Arctic and Russia. The UK had announced in March that they will open a new military base, dubbed Camp Viking, approximately 65 kilometres south of Tromso. This camp is expected to operate for 10 years, with the function of training elite British commandos in the extreme cold. Norway funds the camp for its NATO allies to use, with a statement suggesting that the facility also bolsters security in the region as it can respond rapidly to any threats – if necessary.

In February, Andøya Air Station was announced as one of several new Norwegian-American military bases in the North of Norway as part of the Supplementary Defence Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) between the two countries, which is now under consideration by the Norwegian Parliament. The base has been chosen to be developed into a hub for long-range drones (namely for the purposes of surveillance of the North Sea) and space operations, with new plans to develop a temporary space port – the first of its kind outside the US. The location of this base is particularly suited for early-detection of missiles and for satellite communications.

"The establishment of the satellite station at Andøya Air Station significantly contributes to strengthening Norway's and NATO's defence ability. The cooperation is also a very good example of how bilateral cooperation between two NATO countries benefits the whole of the alliance." - Norwegian Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram

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Immediately following the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz unveiled his now infamous Zeitenwende Speech, a watershed moment for the German Military. With this speech Scholz announced a special fund of €100bn to bolster and modernise the German Military and reverse its previously cautious defence policy. In the present day, this funding has materialised as €71.8bn (2.01% of GDP) – according to the current NATO forecast. 1992 was the last time that Germany had spent above 2% of its GDP for its military, with the cold war years reaching over 3%. This announcement comes following US Presidential contender Donald Trump’s statement saying that under his leadership the US would not be keen to defend NATO countries who do not meet the 2% spending target. Körber-Stiftung reveal that 72% of respondents agree with the German government’s goal of a 2% of GDP military expenditure. However, 71% of respondents had also stated that they oppose Germany taking on a position of military leadership in Europe. Boris Pistorius, the German Defence Minister, affirmed Germany’s commitment to the spending target in a statement, as well as pushing back against opposition suggestions that Germany should increase its Special Military Defence Fund from €100bn to €300bn, suggesting that the regular budgetary amount should be increased instead, to allow for better long-term planning.

The German Military currently faces a multitude of problems which affect its combat effectiveness. For example, there is a general lack of recruitment, with recruitment figures dropping by 11% since last year, with over 18,000 vacant positions. Compulsory military service was abolished in 2011 by Angela Merkel’s government, with politicians arguing that professional armed forces are needed over conscripts. Even with the Zeitenwende, compulsory military service is unlikely to return, partially due to the widespread lack of staff, buildings and equipment:

“We haven’t got the barracks, we don’t have enough staff to carry out the training and we’ve long since phased out the additional resources we would need in order to bring back compulsory national service,” - The chair of the parliamentary defence committee, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (12/23)

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To address this issue, Germany is considering to open recruitment to foreign nationals. Under existing law, only German citizens are allowed to join the military proper, with some roles being open to non-citizens who were born and raised in Germany. Foreign recruits can help meet the strong demand, and this complements plans to recruit an additional 20,000 troops in response to potential growing threats. It is believed that Germany will prioritise recruitment from EU member states, although the country has not explicitly denied the possibility of recruiting from other countries. This strategy has yielded much success for countries such as the UK, who are able to recruit from Commonwealth countries, or France who have an established Foreign Legion. Germany will likely also see success from a similar venture, and narrowing recruitment to EU countries may inadvertently also provide some momentum for the idea of a pan-EU military.

Germany has been the second largest state donor of military aid to Ukraine, doubling potential aid in 2024 to €8bn. This will be financed using the €100bn originally set aside by Scholz in his Zeitenwende speech to modernise the military, amid funding concerns. Whilst this affirms commitments to Ukraine, this may come at the cost of other German policy ambitions, such as the green energy transition, with Scholz admitting that “it is clear that we will have to do with substantially less money to achieve these goals.” Israel has also received a huge amount of German military support, with 10 times more exports to Israel in 2023 than 2022 at over €300m. 85% of military export licenses from Germany to Israel in 2023 were approved after the October 7 attacks. Additionally, Germany is moving to deploy 4,800 German soldiers to Lithuania to begin training in 2025, with the aim of being combat ready by 2027. These developments would have been unthinkable prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Scholz had also stressed that German and EU arms manufacturers must pivot towards mass production of arms as the Russia-Ukraine War had exposed the current vulnerability of EU militaries meeting the demands for ammunition. Rheinmetall, for example, has already begun to expand their production by ordering the construction of a new factory in Unterluess. This plant aims to produce the entire value chain for artillery ammunition, and seeks to help cover the increased demand of the Bundeswehr by producing an additional 200,000 shells annually.

"That is urgently needed. Because as harsh as this reality is: we do not live in times of peace." - Olaf Scholz

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 “Enlargement is a vital policy for the European Union. Completing our Union is the call of history, the natural horizon of our Union. Completing our Union, also has a strong economic and geopolitical logic. Past enlargements have shown the enormous benefits both for the accession countries and the EU. We all win.” - Ursula von der Leyen

The European Commission has published their 2023 Enlargement Package on 8 November, highlighting developments in the accession developments for new prospective members. This article will focus primarily around progress regarding Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, due to the strong progress made by each. However, the progress of other hopeful nations will also be reported.

Firstly, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still working on establishing the conditions required for membership, and the European Commission can only recommend accession negotiations once this degree of compliance has been achieved. Albania has continued to present its ability to implement EU reforms and has complied with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), however further efforts are needed to improve freedom of expression, minority rights, property rights, the rule of law and to protect against corruption and organised crime. Similarly, North Macedonia has reaffirmed EU membership as its goal and continues to align with the CFSP, and has worked quickly to improve social issues. The nation must continue to deliver on EU related reforms, such as the strength of the judiciary and the reduction of organised crime and corruption. The Commission has stated that they look forward to a swift follow up, and aims to open accession negotiations by the end of the year. For Montenegro, the negotiations have stalled following deep levels of polarisation and political instability in the country. Until these trends are reversed EU membership will remain out of view. Serbia has continued to implement EU reforms as required for the membership negotiations, however the nation must cooperate and take necessary steps to take accountability for attacks on Kosovo Police on 24 September and on KFOR on 29 May. Kosovo also remains committed to the European path, having denounced Russian aggression in Ukraine – for example. However, neither Kosovo nor Serbia will be able to join the EU as long as their dispute remains. The EU membership criteria requires a new member to have stable relations with their neighbours, as to not inherit a border crisis. Whilst this dispute is not likely to end in the immediate future, this precondition for EU membership will surely act as a driving force for the normalisation of relations. Negotiations with Türkiye have remained at a standstill due to a decision made by the Council. This is due to Turkish democratic backsliding, and a distancing between the nation and the EU’s CFSP.  Türkiye will need to make significant realignments towards Europe before any new negotiations will be considered.

There is also the political demand for reform within the EU prior to further expansion. The elimination of the veto, in favour of a qualified majority will prevent the reoccurring political quagmire in which two member states can form a partnership and veto any punitive action against the other – as has been seen in the past with Hungary and Poland. This reform will allow for legislation to pass far quicker, and allow the EU to progress without this obstacle.

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Georgia:

Georgia has been awarded Candidate Status following a series of reforms over the past few months. This new legislation has focused around policy actions towards gender equality, reducing organised crime and violence against women, as well as taking account of the European Court of Human Rights. Georgia has also shared an action plan for removing the influence of oligarchs in the country. Additionally, strategies for protecting human rights and enhancing cooperation within civil society have also been put into place. This swift progress is overwhelmingly supported by the people of Georgia as a means to enhance economic potential and grant security against Russia. Following the 2008 invasion, Georgia and Russia have maintained no formal relations. However, Georgia will likely have to resolve border disputes surrounding the lost territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, had suggested in August 2023 that Russia may also annex these territories. Georgia is very unlikely to reclaim them, and may have to renounce these claims before EU membership is granted.

Moldova:

Moldova has made important progress on meeting steps outlined by the Commission, and has launched comprehensive justice reforms. It has reformed its anti-corruption bodies and subsequently has increased the number of investigations and convictions in corruption cases as a result. The state has also introduced a confiscation mechanism in its legislation to help fight organised crime, and has adopted its own plan to reduce the influence of oligarchs. Continued efforts are required, however Moldova also suffers from territorial disputes due to the entity of Transnistria. This autonomous Soviet exclave has its own de-facto government and a population of around 475,000 – according to the 2015 census. This breakaway region must be addressed prior to EU membership.

Ukraine:

Ukraine had been granted candidate status by the EU in June 2022, and has made considerable reforms as a result. The country has established judicial reforms amongst government bodies and has adopted legislation drawing it closer to European ideals, such as support for gender equality and minority rights. It has also taken steps to address the influence of oligarchs and corruption – although it still suffers from severe corruption. Naturally, the war is overpowering and has created pushback from certain European governments about Ukrainian membership, namely Hungary. Whilst the war has acted as a catalyst for rapid reform, it has also damned the country to a delayed entry, as existing members may be hesitant to allow the entry of a destroyed Ukraine – citing economic concerns. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian entry into the EU is still far away, and is dependent largely on how the war with Russia ends. The Commission will also report to the European Council by March 2024 regarding the progress of Moldova and Ukraine, to see what future steps need to be taken.

Since the Russian invasion in February 2022, the Russian Navy has maintained a blockade around key Ukrainian ports, which had threatened the safe export of foodstuffs such as sunflower oil, barley, maize and wheat from one of the world’s breadbaskets. This worked to trap 20 million tonnes of grains within Ukrainian ports that were meant for export, causing international food prices to spike significantly. Whilst Ukraine exports to both developed and developing nations, this economic shock hit the Global South the hardest, causing the United Nations to pursue a Grain Deal for humanitarian reasons.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was an agreement between Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and the United Nations to allow grain shipments out of the Black Sea. The initiative first came into action on 22 July 2022, and has now expired after extension on 18 July 2023. Current negotiations between Putin and Erdogan have failed during talks in Sochi, on the basis that Russian conditions are not being met. The stagnation of negotiations risks a humanitarian crisis as food prices continue to rise across the world. As it stands, the resurrection of the Grain Initiative is dependent on negotiations between several key players, each of which have their own motivations.

Ukraine:

Whilst the Grain Deal was active Ukraine was able to safely export 33 million metric tons of grains to international markets. The agricultural sector provides work for 14% of Ukrainians, and represents one of their most important exports. A proper ability to export grain will contribute towards a healthy economy, which is critical now more than ever. Ukrainian grain stores must also be emptied as soon as possible in order to make room for this year’s harvest, which otherwise risks loss.

Ukraine also has the potential to leverage grain exports for diplomatic benefits. A newfound focus on meeting World Food Programme (WFP) commitments acts as a key example here, with Ukraine now supplying WFP with more than 80% of its grain, compared to 50% of the War – according to EU sources. As such, the Russian blockade is presented as an act of hostility not just against Ukraine, but against all food importers due to a lack of supply, and rising food prices. These efforts garner sympathies from the Global South, which can translate into substantial diplomatic support with calls against the Russian invasion, or at least the naval blockade.

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Russia:

The Russian exit from the Grain Deal was likely motivated by Ukrainian attacks on the Kerch Bridge, which connects Crimea to the Russian mainland. Russia has described such strikes as attacks on civilian infrastructure whilst Ukraine has argued that the bridge was a genuine military target, as it was a key supply point for the Russian Southern front. Nevertheless, Russia has refused to renew the Grain Deal in a recent summit in Sochi on the basis that Russian concerns have not been addressed. As such, Russia is motioning to delay the continuation of the deal until sanctions have been eased on the country. Although the West has not imposed specific agricultural sanctions against Russia, Moscow has said that restrictions such as the disconnection from the SWIFT banking network have deterred shipping firms, international banks and insurers from conducting business with Russian exporters. As a concession, Russia has asked for the state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank to be reconnected to SWIFT – although this has been refused. As a counter offer, the UN has proposed that Russia establish a subsidiary of the bank which may use SWIFT, or that banks such as JPMorgan Chase or the African Export-Import Bank be used as a payment processor for food and fertiliser – which Russia has rejected. Continued strikes against Ukrainian grain stores and port infrastructure will only exacerbate this issue. As thing stand, Russia will benefit from prolonging this stalemate by likely forcing a more meaningful concession from the West for the continuation of the Grain Deal. As pressure begins to mount from the Global South, this will only become more likely.

Turkey:

Turkey has strategically positioned itself as a mediator and a peacemaker between Ukraine and Russia due to its tactical position to the two warring nations. The Montreux Convention allows Ankara control over the straits granting access to the Black Sea, granting the nation control over potential Ukrainian and Russian naval movements. Turkey also has significant economic ties with Russia, as it receives a third of their natural gas, military equipment and millions of tourists each year. These ties have allowed Erdogan and Putin to engage in a summit at Sochi to discuss the potential renewal of the agreement. Putin has suggested that Russia would be able to ship one million tons of grain to Turkey at reduced prices, to be processed and forwarded to the countries most dependent. Although Putin has rejected the peacemaking effort so far, Turkey still presents itself as the most likely candidate to help reach an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

The Global South:

A key Russian criticism of the Grain Deal was that a significant part of Ukraine’s grain export was directed towards developed countries, rather than developing countries as suggested. However, UN sources suggested that 57% of foodstuffs exported from Ukraine reached developing countries. Even though 43% of foodstuffs went to developed countries, this still benefits poorer countries as the increased supply depressed the international price, making food more affordable for all. The issue was also raised during the 2023 Russia – Africa Summit, as African leaders pressed Putin to renew the grain deal. On the flip side, the Kremlin has worked to begin supplying key African allies with up to 50,000 tonnes of grain – although this is limited to Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Mali, Somalia and Zimbabwe. However, this effort is eclipsed by Ukraine’s contribution towards the WFP, which has allowed for a supply of 725,000 tonnes of grain to reach Afghanistan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

EU:

The European Union has expressed that it is capable of aiding Ukraine in exporting its grain via European solidarity lanes. However, these overland trade corridors are under considerable strain, due to Ukrainian railways using a different gauge to EU states, meaning that grain must be physically transferred between wagons – which has considerably slowed the speed of export. Overland corridors have been overloaded, which has resulted in Eastern European states being hit with the majority of the Ukrainian supply. As a result, Ukrainian grain may only be imported into the EU if it does not land in these states, with Poland pushing for an extension in these restrictions until the bloc can invest in increased solidarity lanes. Poland has invested 100 million euros into projects to increase rail capacity, whilst Romania has worked to expand Constanța's port capacity. These measures will surely help the issue, however Brussels estimates that billions of future investments may be needed – and EU coffers are already at their limits.

The EU estimates that only around 30% of Ukrainian grain is transported via road and rail, with the majority still being exported via naval routes. The UK Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board says that 65% of Ukrainian grain exports are leaving via the ports of Izmail and Reni, which are to be transported via Romanian ports. This hyper focus around the Danube has drawn Russian military attention towards the region, with almost daily drone strikes on the ports. Critically, some Russian drone debris has landed in Romanian territory – a NATO state. This flare in tensions will likely not be escalated as it is not seen as an intentional attack on Romania. Nevertheless, the mayor of the Ceatalchioi community in Romania, Tudor Chernega, has asked authorities to consider evacuating residents of the village of Plauru, which borders Ukraine on the Danube. Russian efforts to impede Ukrainian exports are therefore highlighted, which will likely continue to draw criticism from the Global South and Europe alike, and may result in increased sanctions should drones continue to hit EU territory, accidentally or not.

China:

China was the single largest recipient of Ukrainian grain whilst the Grain Deal was active, receiving almost 8 tonnes of goods, worth nearly 25% of the total Ukrainian grain export. UN figures suggest that of the 7.9 million tonnes received, Beijing received 5.8 million tonnes of corn, 1.8 million tonnes of sunflower meal, 370,000 tonnes of sunflower oil and 340,000 tonnes of barley. Whilst China will lose out economically by having to replace these imports at a higher price due to the end of the Grain Deal, Beijing will not press Russia on the issue, as Beijing will simultaneously benefit from discounted Russian exports and market access, due to isolation from international markets.

China has also poised itself to act as a peacekeeper for the conflict, although the nation appears far less capable than Turkey in this regard – perhaps due to its geographical distance and an affinity for Russian policy. China has also been a major supplier of weaponry and microelectronics to Russia during this conflict, which will naturally generate resentment from Ukrainian officials. The Chinese envoy to Ukraine, Li Hui has been criticised in these regards as he may prioritise acting as a mediator, rather than work towards a meaningful agreement for both parties.

This year, Norway has benefitted from several substantial discoveries of minerals and rare earth metals. These discoveries include the now world’s biggest phosphate reserve, as well as substantial levels of rare earth metals and copper in the seabed. As a result, Norway will be able to exploit these hugely significant sources of minerals to further accelerate their economy. Regionally, Europe will also benefit by being able to purchase such metals from Norway, rather than traditional suppliers such as Morocco for Phosphate or China for rare earth metals – which were thought to own the majority of the Earth’s supply. These minerals will be used to produce parts for wind turbines, solar panels, fertilisers, electric batteries and more – which has created huge strategic interests around these reserves, and more broadly those found in the Arctic Ocean.

Norge Mining are the Norwegian mining firm responsible for excavating the newly discovered Phosphate deposit of around 70 billion tonnes. They have released a statement saying that this deposit will allow for a supply of at least 50 years, a breath of fresh air for the European Union who had the resource listed as a product of strategic importance. Furthermore, phosphate rock will allow for phosphorus production in Europe – allowing the continent to benefit from greater strategic autonomy. Around 90% of the world’s mined phosphorus is used in agriculture for production of fertilisers, for which there is no alternative. The remaining 10% is used for the production of renewable energy sources such as solar panels and electric batteries. Earlier this year, Norway had also discovered substantial levels of materials on its extended continental shelf. These materials include: 38 million tonnes of copper, 45 million tonnes of zinc, 24 million tonnes of magnesium, 3.1 million tonnes of cobalt and 1.7 million tonnes of cerium. Environmental groups such as WWF and Greenpeace have criticised the Norwegian Government’s move to open its waters to deep sea mining, focusing on the harm to the biodiversity of marine life on the sea beds. The Norwegian Government has responded in tune by saying that the excavation of these materials is critical to the success of Europe’s green transition. Nevertheless, 280,000 square kilometres of ocean are set to be opened to deep sea mining, pending further parliamentary discussions in the autumn.

Swedish mining company LKAB has also made an announcement early this year that they have discovered Europe’s largest deposit of rare earth metals. These materials are thought to be praseodymium or neodymium oxides, which are used to produce magnets used in electric vehicles. Despite the bureaucracy behind attaining further mining and exploration licenses, these developments further enable the European climate transition and the European Green Deal to reach fruition.

Following the Norwegian offshore discovery in January, the Kremlin has announced that Vladimir Putin has held talks with top security officials about expanding Russian claims to their continental shelf – which would ensure them undisputed access to more of the Arctic Ocean’s resources under The United Nation’s Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Such behaviour has warranted concern from Arctic neighbours such as Canada and Denmark, who each have their own claims. NATO activity in the Arctic has continued to expand in recent years, which has been met by a similar expansion of Russian military infrastructure in the region. Either way, these developments are sure to heat up the Arctic.